Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2005

Elizabeth Ruth Mueller v. David G. Allen, Susan S.
Allen, Randy N. McCandless and Halene
McCandless : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gary A. Weston; Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee.
Mary C. Corporon; Corporon & Williams; P.C.; Attorney for Defendant/Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Mueller v. Allen, No. 20040208 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5486

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ELIZABETH RUTH MUELLER, also
known as ELIZABETH MULLER,
formerly known as ELIZABETH
RUTH
M. ALLEN,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appellate Case No. 20040208 - CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,
-vsDAVID G. ALLEN; SUSAN S.,
ALLEN; RANDY N. McCANDLESS;
and HALENE McCANDLESS
Defendants/Appellants.

District Court Case No. 020910005
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
A10
DOCKET NO.
ZOO^O^^

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE THIRD
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
HONORABLE GLENN K. IWASAKI, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MARY C. CORPORON (#734)
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
808 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801)328-1162
GARY A. WESTON (#3435)
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
53rd Park Plaza, Suite 400
5217 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
(801) 327-8200

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

FEB 2 2 2005

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ELIZABETH RUTH MUELLER, also
known as ELIZABETH MULLER,
formerly known as ELIZABETH
RUTH
M. ALLEN,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appellate Case No. 20040208 - CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,
District Court Case No. 020910005
-vsDAVID G. ALLEN; SUSAN S.,
ALLEN; RANDY N. McCANDLESS;
and HALENE McCANDLESS
Defendants/Appellants.

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE THIRD
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
HONORABLE GLENN K. IWASAKI, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MARY C. CORPORON (#734)
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
808 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801)328-1162
GARY A. WESTON (#3435)
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
53rd Park Plaza, Suite 400
5217 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
(801) 327-8200

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

FACTUAL DISPUTES

1

ARGUMENT

5

POINT I

AS A MATTER OF LAW, DAVID ALLEN COULD NOT
AND DID NOT TRESPASS AGAINST THE PROPERTY
INTERESTS OF ELIZABETH MUELLER

5

POINT II

AS A MATTER OF LAW, SUSAN ALLEN COULD NOT
AND DID NOT TRESPASS AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF
ELIZABETH MUELLER
8

POINT III

THE TRIAL COURT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION

POINT IV

APPELLANTS HAVE MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE
PERTAINING TO THEIR CHALLENGE TO THE
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
JURY'S VERDICT

9

11

CONCLUSION

24

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

25

I

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-18-1 (1953 as amended)

n

22

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ELIZABETH RUTH MUELLER, also
known as ELIZABETH MULLER,
formerly known as ELIZABETH
RUTH
M. ALLEN,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appellate Case No. 20040208 - CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,
District Court Case No. 020910005
-vsDAVID G. ALLEN; SUSAN S.,
ALLEN; RANDY N. McCANDLESS;
and HALENE McCANDLESS
Defendants/Appellants.

Defendants/Appellants (hereinafter "Defendants" or "Aliens") submit the
following as their reply brief in the above-entitled matter:
FACTUAL DISPUTES
Appellants stand by the statement of facts set forth in their opening brief. As to
various factual claims raised by Appellee in her brief, the Appellants allege the following:
1.

In the "statement of the case" portion of her brief, the Appellee (hereinafter

also "Plaintiff) asserts that, four months after her divorce from David Allen, the Aliens,
without the knowledge of consent of Elizabeth Mueller gave the Defendants Randy and
Halene McCandless possession of the parties' home. As set forth in the Appellant's

recitation of facts, in their opening brief, the McCandlesses occupied the property in
question (the "Property") some nine months after Plaintiff and Defendant David Allen
had separated and almost six months after the entry of the Decree of Divorce. Further,
the McCandlesses occupied the property after a point in time when Elizabeth Mueller had
reached the point where she was simply willing to get out of the property and out of the
obligation thereon, and to save herself from a foreclosure on her credit report. (Tr. Vol. 2
pg. 110 lines 1-3; 9-11).
2.

It is contended by Plaintiff that she never consented to rent the property to

anyone, and specifically not to the McCandlesses. However, the record in this case would
indicate that, at various points in time, Plaintiff expressed a specific interest in renting the
property because it was so far into foreclosure that rental income needed to be generated.
(R. 577: 38, 40-41; 578: 302-304). Plaintiff told Rick Curtis she wanted to rent the
property. (Tr. Vol. 2 pg. 177).
3.

It is asserted in Plaintiffs brief that it was Susan Allen who gave the

McCandlesses occupancy of the property. On the contrary, it was her son, David Allen,
an owner of the property who did so. The McCandlesses consistently testified at trial that
it was their understanding the property was owned by David Allen and his wife Elizabeth
Mueller, and that they were doing business only with David Allen and Elizabeth Mueller,
with Susan Allen acting as an agent or intermediary. (Tr. Vol. 2 pg. 178, pg. 228).
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4.

On the day that the McCandlesses moved in to the property, Susan Allen

telephoned Elizabeth Mueller, requested a return call, and the Plaintiff then telephoned
Susan Allen. During this conversation, which was recorded, Susan Allen advised
Elizabeth Mueller, among other things, that Susan Allen would have the McCandlesses
move out right away if Elizabeth Mueller wanted that to happen (Exhibit 19; R. 577: 49).
The Plaintiff did not tell either Susan Allen or David Allen that she wanted the
McCandlesses to move out of the property until this lawsuit was commenced. (R. 578:
132-133).
5.

In her testimony at trial and to this court (paragraph 20 of the Appellee's

"Statement of Material Facts") Elizabeth Mueller continues to assert that she "has never
received any offer from [the Aliens] to pay to her any amount of rental. . . ." In fact, this
constituted a factual misrepresentation of the Plaintiff to the jury, of which the trial court
did not permit a correction. Specifically, the Aliens had made several offers of settlement
in this case, which are contained within the record as Offers of Judgment. Her testimony
to the effect that she had never "received any offer," which was allowed to stand by the
trial court, likely left a false impression with the jury that the Defendants had never
attempted to resolve this case amicably, when in fact they had.
6.

In paragraph 31 of the Plaintiffs Statements of Fact, Plaintiff characterizes

David Allen's conduct with closing the sale of the property as providing "fictitious
financing" in an amount of $8,485.00. In fact, David Allen carried back a second lien

against the property, which was actually recorded as a trust deed and trust deed note for
$8,485.00, requiring payments by McCandlesses of $62.25. The McCandlesses executed
a promissory note in that amount. There is absolutely nothing "fictitious" about this
arrangement. The McCandlesses may not have understood the documents they signed. It
may be surmised that many lay people who execute real estate closing documents or other
contracts do not fully understand the terms and conditions of the papers they are signing.
This does not make the documents "fictitious." It also does not matter that the
McCandlesses had never made a payment on the promissory note as of the time of trial.
By the time the sale to the McCandlesses closed, Plaintiff and Defendant David Allen had
not made a payment on their mortgage for approximately one year. This failure to make
payments did not render the mortgage "fictitious." It also does not matter that David
Allen himself appears to have been confused about the terms of the sale of his former
property. The documents are binding, and speak for themselves.
It is clear there is a great deal of minutia surrounding this entire property
transaction over the better part of one year. However, the basic outline of the facts
remain: Plaintiff and her former husband, David Allen, were both adults. They got
themselves into ownership of a property in extremely poor condition, were unable to
repair or improve the property, and it apparently deteriorated while in their possession.
Eventually, they divorced and were absolutely unable to make mortgage payments on the
property. Their mortgage fell almost one year in arrears before the sale to the
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McCandlesses saved them from foreclosure. Despite all of her protestations that she did
not like the situation, Elizabeth Mueller (an adult and property owner) did not find a real
estate listing agent, did not offer the property for sale by owner, and did not keep
possession and control of the property when she had it, in order to control and accomplish
the sale. She elected instead to dump the responsibility onto her former husband and his
family. She never produced a buyer for the property. She never produced a tenant for the
property. She never paid one dime out of her own funds either to keep and maintain the
property or to salvage it from foreclosure once she abandoned it. For this irresponsible
course of conduct, Plaintiff hopes to retain a judgment against her former husband and
her former mother-in-law for sums in excess of $50,000.00, together no doubt with
attorney's fees and surcharges she hopes to be paid for this appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

AS A MATTER OF LAW, DAVID ALLEN COULD NOT AND
DID NOT TRESPASS AGAINST THE PROPERTY
INTERESTS OF ELIZABETH MUELLER

The Plaintiff asserts in her brief that David Allen could have and did trespass
against the property interests of his co-tenant, Elizabeth Mueller. Plaintiff correctly
asserts that the parties, Elizabeth Mueller and David Allen, were tenants in common of
the property until it was purchased by the McCandlesses. Thus, as Plaintiff correctly
asserts, each party had an undivided one-half interest in the property.
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Plaintiff cites several cases for the proposition that a joint tenant of real property
can trespass against the joint tenancy of a co-tenant. This is not the holding of any
cases cited by Plaintiff. There is no case law in Utah saying that one joint tenant can
trespass against another joint tenant. All the cases cited by Plaintiff stand for something
else.
Plaintiffs argument in her brief utterly ignores the impact upon her property rights of
the Decree of Divorce. Plaintiff seeks to argue this situation in her brief as though she
and David Allen were merely joint tenants. Such was not the case. They were joint
tenants in the property who had already participated in one legal proceeding to determine
their rights, as against each other. In that other legal proceeding (the divorce) a Utah
court, through the Decree of Divorce, had already made specific orders about disposition
of the property. These parties no longer had the right to be treated simply as joint tenants
of certain real property, without restriction. Each party was absolutely bound by the terms
of the Decree of Divorce. Pursuant to that Decree of Divorce, the parties had lost
numerous property rights they had previously held as against each other. Most
compellingly, the majority of joint tenants in real property are not under some legal
obligation to sell the property. In fact, an interfering order of a court or government
mandating that they sell their property would be a violation of numerous constitutional
principles, absent substantial guarantees of due process and absent a compelling
government interest in taking the property. However, this private property right had
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changed fundamentally as between these two property owners; they were under a Decree
of Divorce absolutely mandating that they sell the property.
Thus, the Plaintiffs protestations here that she stood in the capacity of an
unrestricted joint tenant in property, and that her co-tenant had violated her rights is
without basis. She stood in the unique position of a joint tenant who is under the
obligation of a court order to do one thing and one thing only with her property, and that
is to sell it.
Given that the Third District Court in the Decree of Divorce must have
contemplated that Plaintiff would be required to give up possession of the property in
order to sell it; and that sole and exclusive occupancy and possession of the property
would have to go to somebody else in order for it to be sold; and given that Elizabeth
Mueller was doing nothing whatsoever to advance the cause of selling the property per
the Decree of Divorce, she cannot now complain of the events which occurred here. She
cannot now complain that her land was taken from her, or that occupancy of the land was
given to someone else. In fact, what Defendant David Allen accomplished by his actions
complained of was exactly what was contemplated by the Decree of Divorce; namely that
the property was sold, and the parties relieved of the burden of continuing to own that
property.
It is extremely important to note that Elizabeth Mueller never claimed at trial and
does not claim at this appeal that the property should have been sold for more money than
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its eventual sales price, or that he undersold the property, or that there were other ready
buyers who were excluded by the occupancy of the McCandlesses. Essentially, her only
complaint is to the effect that David Allen went about selling the property in a way she
didn't like, while she presented no alternatives whatsoever.
Under the totality of these circumstances, the Court's instruction to the jury, to the
effect that Elizabeth Mueller could recover damages against David Allen for trespass was
error. This instruction to the jury was objected to timely by Mr. Allen and was error by
the trial court.
POINT II

AS A MATTER OF LAW, SUSAN ALLEN COULD NOT AND
DID NOT TRESPASS AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF
ELIZABETH MUELLER

Elizabeth Mueller not only claimed trespass in her property interests by her former
husband, but by her former mother-in-law as well. Her claim in this regard is essentially
this: that her co-tenant in the property, David Allen, gave his mother and the
McCandlesses permission to enter upon the property, and that their entry constituted
trespass against her interests.
Her claim against Susan Allen is essentially that Susan Allen entered upon the
property without Elizabeth Mueller's permission, and violated Elizabeth Mueller's
interests in the property.
Plaintiff, in her brief, absolutely fails to address the question of whether Susan
Allen, having had permission from David Allen to enter upon the property, committed
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some kind of trespass herself by dealing with the McCandlesses at the instruction of her
son, David Allen. None of the case law cited by the Plaintiff discusses the question of a
person, such as one in Susan Allen's position, who enters real property with the
permission of one joint tenant to the property, but then learns after the fact of objections
to that entry by another joint tenant. There is absolutely nothing to suggest that the
Defendant, Susan Allen, committed a trespass against the property by entering upon it in
good faith, with permission from her son.
It should be noted that this issue of whether Susan Allen can have entered upon the
premises in an act of trespass at all, having had permission of the Plaintiff s joint tenant,
is an issue which goes to the question of whether the jury verdict can be supported by the
evidence and sustained as a matter of law.
POINT III THE TRIAL COURT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION
The divorce proceeding between Plaintiff and Defendant David Allen vested the
divorce court with exclusive jurisdiction to determine Elizabeth Mueller's claims
regarding the sale of the property which had been ordered by that divorce court. Further,
the Decree of Divorce resulting in the Third District Court divorce action constituted a res
judicata order as to Elizabeth Mueller's claims in the trial court here, and collaterally
estopped the claims of the Plaintiff herein.
Plaintiff alleges that the court below had jurisdiction, and that the matters here
were neither res judicata nor collaterally estopped, because all of the issues in this
-9-

particular case arose months after the entry of the Decree of Divorce. She further makes
the claim that the claims herein were not only against her husband, David Allen, but also
against Susan Allen and the McCandlesses, rendering the proceedings in the trial court
proper.
It does not matter that the issues herein arose months after the entry of the Decree
of Divorce. As noted in Appellant's opening brief, the divorce court had continuing
jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree and the orders of the divorce court. As
explained in Appellant's opening brief, the whole factual scenario giving rise to this
claim has to do with circumstances which were properly part of the divorce decree
enforcement: that Elizabeth Mueller abandoned the property; that the parties had
attempted to sell their real estate as required by the divorce court, without success; and
that the Defendant, David Allen, eventually engaged in the whole pattern of activity
complained of as a means to sell the property under the Decree of Divorce.
If Plaintiff did not like the fact that the property had not sold, or the means and
manner by which David Mueller was attempting to sell it, then her proper and only
remedy was to go back to the court which had issued the order for sale (the Third Judicial
District Court in the divorce action) and to complain to that court that things were not
progressing as ordered. Despite Elizabeth Mueller's protestations at trial herein that she
was somehow precluded from controlling how the sale of this property was handled, or
from evicting the McCandlesses when she wanted them evicted, the divorce court always
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possessed the power to resolve this problem quickly, upon an expedited order to show
cause before the divorce court's domestic relations commissioner, and then before the
assigned judge if necessary. Means and methods exist within divorce cases quickly to
resolve problems of this nature, without the necessity of protracted litigation. However,
instead of employing this method available to her in the divorce action, Elizabeth Mueller
chose to pursue this civil claim for damages against her former husband, and against
those who were parties to his efforts to sell the property according to the terms of the
divorce decree. Over the objections of the Defendant, the trial court improperly permitted
this action to go forward.
This permission of the trial court to the Plaintiff to proceed, in the face of the order
already existing in the divorce court, and the remedies available there, constituted one of
the errors for which Appellants are entitled to relief.
POINT IV

APPELLANTS HAVE MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE
PERTAINING TO THEIR CHALLENGE TO THE
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
JURY'S VERDICT

Appellants conceded the obligation to marshal the evidence in support of the jury's
verdict, and then to refute the same, in order to succeed on their claim that the verdict is
not supported by the evidence. Aliens have fully and adequately marshaled the evidence
in this case, to support their claims that the jury verdict cannot be sustained as a matter of
law.
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In her brief, the Plaintiff asserts various evidence which she claims were
unaddressed in the opening brief Aliens contend that, in fact, all of these issues and the
matters surrounding them have been fully discussed in the Appellant's opening brief, or
that the evidence is not truly relevant to support the jury verdict. The Aliens contend that
the evidence cited by Plaintiff is not relevant, in the following particulars:
1.

As to paragraphs 1 and 2, found at page 31, the fact that a person signing a

lease intended the lessees to have sole and exclusive occupancy of the home is
immaterial. Obviously, someone who executes a lease and takes possession of property
as a single family dwelling takes it assuming that they, as the lessee, have sole possession
with their family. This evidence is further irrelevant because Elizabeth Mueller, herself
testified that she had abandoned the property at the end of 2001, intending never to
occupy it and intending it to be sold pursuant to the Decree of Divorce. She had no
intention or inclination whatsoever to move back into the property and occupy it. She
also testified, as noted in Appellant's opening brief, that she simply wanted the property
to be sold, and herself to be protected from the mortgage obligation and from having a
foreclosure upon her credit report. Since this was her own stated sole objective, the fact
that the Defendant David Allen allowed third parties to occupy the premises (in the face
of a direct court order to sell the property) is irrelevant.
2.

It is irrelevant that, as set forth in paragraph 3 page 31 of the brief, Susan

Allen admitted Elizabeth Mueller had never authorized her to put a tenant in the property.
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This is irrelevant because it was not Susan Allen who "put a tenant in the property." The
person who "put a tenant in the property" was David Allen. This was the testimony of
Susan and David Allen and Halene McCandless in the trial, as noted in the Appellant's
opening brief. It is irrelevant that Elizabeth Mueller never authorized Susan Allen to "put
a tenant in the property" because Susan Allen had no authority to do so, with or without
Elizabeth Mueller's permission, and did not do so.
3.

The evidence set forth at paragraph 4 page 31 is also irrelevant. Whether or

not Susan Allen told Halene McCandless that Elizabeth Mueller had given permission for
the McCandlesses to rent the home is immaterial. Susan Allen never rented the property
to anyone. That was the sole and exclusive conduct of an owner of the property, David
Allen, acting under a court order requiring him to do what was necessary to sell the
house. Thus, what Susan Allen did or did not tell the McCandlesses is irrelevant.
4.

The evidence contained at paragraph 5 page 31 is also irrelevant. What

Susan Allen, as a realtor, would typically recommend to a client about placing a
prospective buyer in a property prior to closing, is irrelevant. The facts and circumstances
of this case were driven by a highly undesirable parcel of property, which had not sold for
a year despite continuous listing on the multiple listing service. Further, the mortgage on
the property was in arrears for months before the McCandlesses occupied the property,
and was in foreclosure by the time this action was filed. What Susan Allen would
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recommend to a "typical" seller has no relevancy to what she would (and did) recommend
here.
5.

The evidence set forth at paragraph 6 page 31 is irrelevant to this case.

Again, the March 5, 2002 offer to purchase the home by the McCandlesses was not the
contract pursuant to which the property was ultimately closed. The fact that the
McCandlesses did or did not initially offer to purchase the home pursuant to FHA
financing and that Susan Allen knew or did not know that the property would not qualify
for FHA financing is irrelevant to a determination of Defendants' culpability under the
Plaintiffs theories for recovery.
6.

The evidence set forth in paragraph 7 page 31 is, first of all, inaccurate.

Susan Allen had nothing whatsoever to do with the giving the McCandlesses occupancy
of the home. She could not give them occupancy since she did not own the property. It
was David Allen who gave the McCandlesses occupancy of the property by signing a
lease. Further, it is irrelevant to the consideration of these proceedings that the
McCandlesses had credit problems or that they needed a "B Loan" for people having
trouble with credit. The fact remains that this was a highly distressed property. It is
highly unlikely that anyone having A credit would want to buy this property to live in it.
The McCandlesses eventually did buy the property, despite their credit problems. The
fact that anyone may have known about their credit problems prior to the McCandlesses
occupancy is irrelevant.
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7.

The evidence contained in paragraph 8 page 32 is, likewise, immaterial.

What the McCandlesses did or did not know about their credit standing as of April 22,
2002 is irrelevant. The fact that the McCandlesses needed 100% financing for the loan is
irrelevant. They eventually bought the property. They kept being told by their mortgage
broker they could qualify. The McCandlesses (together with David Allen and his parents)
eventually saved Elizabeth Mueller from owing the mortgage, from owing deficiencies
out of the foreclosure, and from having a foreclosure upon her own credit report. What
somebody thought in the course of the process of their buying the property is immaterial.
8.

The evidence set forth in paragraph 9 page 32 is irrelevant. First of all, it is

irrelevant what Susan Allen thought about collecting rental from or evicting the
McCandlesses from the property. Susan Allen had no interest in the property whatsoever.
The only property interest was held by her son, David Allen, and by the Plaintiff. Only
the Plaintiff and David Allen could either collect delinquent rent or evict the
McCandlesses. Further, it is irrelevant what David Allen understood by the Plaintiffs
attorney's demand letter. Plaintiff, who was doing nothing to find a buyer for the
property, doing nothing to support the property, doing nothing to stave off a foreclosure,
and doing nothing to comply with the Decree of Divorce, could have said whatever she
wanted in a demand letter through her counsel. What she demanded through her counsel
was simply irrelevant to an ultimate conclusion of the case.
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9.

The evidence set forth at paragraph 10 page 32 is likewise irrelevant. The

fact that Halene McCandless, after receiving a notice to pay rent or quit (a fact which is
marshaled and addressed in Plaintiffs opening brief). That she spoke to either Susan or
David Allen and read the notice over the phone is immaterial. That discrete fact is
irrelevant, compared to the fact of the eviction notice, which has been addressed.
10.

The evidence set forth in paragraph 11 page 32 is irrelevant. The fact that

the McCandlesses were denied a third loan application in August of 2002 is not relevant.
The fact remains that they actually purchased the property.
11.

The evidence contained in paragraph 12 page 32 is irrelevant. What David

Allen would have hypothetically done at some hypothetical point is irrelevant to a
consideration of the evidence in this case. What any witness might hypothetically have
done under some hypothetical set of circumstances is not relevant, compared to the
question of what the parties actually did.
12.

The evidence set forth in paragraph 13 page 32 is not relevant. The fact

that David Allen eventually expressed an opinion substantially similar to the opinion of
Elizabeth Mueller, that he was tired of dealing with the property and was ready to let fate
take its course, is not relevant to the consideration of liability in this case.
13.

The evidence set forth in paragraph 14 page 32 is not relevant. First, the

fact that Susan Allen was aware of the notice to pay rent or quit is not material. The fact
that Susan Allen knew that the McCandlesses had been denied a loan is immaterial. She
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was not an owner of the property. She was not an agent for anyone on the property, at the
relevant time. She was not the tenant occupying the property in violation of a notice to
pay delinquent rent or quit possession. Hence, her level of awareness or lack of it is
wholly irrelevant. The fact that the McCandlesses paid partial rent to David Allen in
September of 2002 is fully addressed in Defendant's opening brief.
14.

With regard to the evidence set forth in paragraph 15 at page 33, the

Defendants have already fully addressed the method and manner by which the
McCandlesses came up with the $14,000.00 necessary for them to close the sale of the
property in their opening brief. The same is true of the evidence set forth at paragraph 16,
page 33.
15.

The evidence contained in paragraph 17 at page 33 is already addressed in

the evidence marshaled by the Defendants, to the effect that there is a second deed of trust
against the property in the sum of $8,485.00 owing by the McCandlesses to David Allen.
The fact that David Allen may have been confused about the legal effect of these
documents at various points in time, or the fact that the McCandlesses have never made
any payment under the promissory note is irrelevant to the Plaintiffs claims of trespass
against the Aliens or interference with business relationships.
16.

The evidence set forth at paragraph 18 page 33 is irrelevant. The fact that

some party closing the sale of real estate did not understand and appreciate the full legal
impact of all the documents signed at a real estate closing has no relevance whatsoever.
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The relevant facts are what the documents themselves actually say and the legal impact of
those documents. In fact, under the parole evidence rule, a person's individual
understanding about legal documents is likely utterly irrelevant.
17.

The evidence set forth at paragraph 19 page 33 is already addressed in the

Defendant's marshaling of evidence in their opening brief.
18.

The evidence in paragraph 20 page 33, to the effect that the McCandlesses

have never actually made payments on the promissory note is irrelevant. The Plaintiffs
damages accrued or failed to accrue, as of the time the property sold. She has made no
claim at trial for any interest in the promissory note. Conduct occurring after all of the
events complained of by Plaintiff is utterly irrelevant to a determination of the facts
surrounding the events she is complaining about.
19.

The evidence set forth at paragraph 21 page 34 has already been addressed

in the Defendant's marshaling of evidence.

The Appellant's requirement to marshal evidence has been met in this case. The
Appellant's opening brief contains more than a voluminous recitation of the evidence. It
also includes a correlation of the particular items of evidence with the challenged
findings, and a demonstration of how the challenged findings are clearly erroneous under
the evidence.
The Court must consider whether there is a factual basis for the jury to have found
any tort against the Defendants Allen. There is no such evidence.
-18-

The jury verdict in this case is for compensatory damages of $8,100.00 against
David Allen on the claim of tortuous interference with Elizabeth Mueller's business
relationships. There is no evidence to support the conclusion that Elizabeth Mueller had
any business relationship whatsoever which was interfered with by David Allen. All
David Allen did in this case was comply with the Decree of Divorce, which required him
to sell the real property. He did so. If Elizabeth Mueller believes that David Allen owes
her money out of the sale of the property, as part of the marital property division, then
that issue would have been properly addressed in the Decree of Divorce. It does not
properly constitute a claim for tortuous interference.
The jury verdict also found compensatory damages of $10,000.00 against David
Allen and Susan Allen jointly and severally for trespass. (It should be noted, thus, that
the only basis for a punitive damages claim against Susan Allen was the finding of
trespass.) The jury verdict also contained a punitive damages award of $5,000.00 against
David Allen and $30,000.00 against Susan Allen.
As noted in Defendant's opening brief, and above, there is no evidence in the
record that Susan Allen trespassed against the interest of Elizabeth Mueller in any
manner. All of the conduct complained of by Elizabeth Mueller (the renting of the home
to the McCandlesses, allowing the McCandlesses to remain in the property for months
thereafter, the failure to support her proposed eviction action against the McCandlesses,
and the ultimate sale of the home to the McCandlesses) were conduct of the Defendant
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David Allen and not the conduct of Susan Allen. Since Susan Allen did not own the
property, she could not have put the McCandlesses in possession. Since she did not own
the properly, she could not have evicted the McCandlesses. Since she did not own the
property, she could not have collected the rent therefrom. Since she did not own the
property, she could not have sold the property to anyone, nor could she have failed to do
so.
The only evidence at trial which may have supported a finding of trespass against
Susan Allen would have been some evidence that Susan Allen had personally entered the
premises, or had acted to place people in the property, without authority from a title
owner. All of the evidence at trial and all of the evidence marshaled in this case is to the
effect that Susan Allen never entered the property without permission from someone of
authority to give her such (either David Allen, the owner, or the McCandlesses, the
tenants). Under these circumstances, there is no evidence whatsoever to support a finding
of trespass against Susan Allen, and no evidence to support the compensatory damage nor
the punitive damage award against her, based upon trespass. Further, there is no evidence
at trial to support a finding of trespass against David Allen, because he acted as a joint
tenant of the property, and because he acted under the direct onus of a court order which
required him to sell the property (and therefore to give possession of the same to someone
other than Elizabeth Mueller).
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Because there can be no basis for a finding of trespass against David Allen or
Susan Allen, there can be no basis for compensatory or punitive damages awards against
them.
Moreover, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-18-1 (1953 as amended),
punitive damages may be awarded if and only if it can be established by clear and
convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the tort feasor are the result of willfull
and malicious or intentionally fradulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and
reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of another person. Under the
facts of this case, it is impossible to find, as a matter of law, by any burden of proof, that
David Allen, who put other people in possession of his marital home, and then sold the
property to them, while under a court order requiring him to sell the property, conducted
himself in a "willfull and malicious or intentionally fraudulent" manner or conducted
himself toward Elizabeth Mueller in a manner that "manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference toward" the rights of Elizabeth Mueller.
Even more so, it is impossible to determine from the facts in this case that, Susan
Allen conducted herself willfully and maliciously or in any intentionally fraudulent
manner toward Elizabeth Mueller, or with a disregard for the rights of Elizabeth Mueller.
This is because Susan Allen could not have done anything with the property, either to rent
it, sell it, evict tenants from it, collect rent upon it, or otherwise. She simply did not have
possession or control of the property and never exercised such. All of the conduct in
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which she engaged was at the direction of a title owner of the property (David Allen)
acting under the strength of a court order requiring him to dispose of the property.
In her brief, the Plaintiff, at pages 37 through 41 attempts to explain why the jury
verdict is supported. She recites a tortured history of a young couple failing economically,
and attempting to sell a highly undesirable distressed property. She recites many failed
efforts to sell the property to the ultimate buyers, before the sale finally closed. None of
this, however, supports her final conclusion that this evidence demonstrates "David Allen
and Susan Allen had a knowing and reckless indifference to Elizabeth Mueller's rights in
her home." Elizabeth Mueller complains of the "risk and concern" imposed upon her.
None of the Defendants imposed upon Ms. Mueller any risk, and Ms. Mueller would
likely have been extraordinarily concerned about her circumstances, irrespective of the
conduct of the Defendants. She was obligated for a mortgage she could not afford. That
was not the result of any tortuous conduct by anyone-it was the result of Elizabeth
Mueller's and David Allen's foolish decision to buy a home they could not afford. She
found herself in the unenviable position of being the owner of a bad piece of property.
Again, this was not the result of anyone's tortuous conduct-she knew the property was in
distressed condition when she bought it. This was the result of David Allen's and
Elizabeth Mueller's foolish decision to buy a "handyman special" when they had neither
the ability nor the financial means to repair the property, nor to develop the property into
something else more valuable. The Plaintiff found herself owning property for which the
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mortgage was in arrears, and for which there was eventually a foreclosure proceeding.
She could find no buyer for the property, despite the fact that she and her former husband
had had the property listed for sale for a year.
All of this was no doubt distressing and concerning, but such was not caused by
any trespass nor interference with business relationships.
The real crux of the Defendant's claim (and the likely cause of the jury's
outrageous punitive damage award) is exactly the Plaintiffs argument set forth at page 41
of her brief:
Notwithstanding, Susan Allen being a Utah licensed real estate sales person
for some 14 years was the only "professional" with regard to the
circumstance and clearly knew better, undertook to engage in activities
clearly and consistently inappropriate to her licensing and the punitive
damages award clearly should be a deterrent to further similar engagement
in her real estate transactions.
Absolutely none of this theory for recovery of punitive damages here was plead by
Plaintiff nor instructed to the jury nor argued to the jury as a basis for a punitive damage
award. Plaintiff has no claims here against the Defendant Susan Allen for professional
misconduct or professional negligence ("malpractice"). It must be kept constantly in
mind that the only basis for a punitive damages award was and is a finding of trespass,
and absolutely nothing in this argument of Plaintiff has anything to do with the concept of
trespass.
The verdict, and especially the punitive damage award, cannot be sustained.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the case should be remanded to the trial court to vacate
the judgment as a matter of law. In the alternative, the case should be remanded to vacate
the punitive damages awarded. In the alternative, the matter should be remanded for new
trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of February, 2005.
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.

MARY C. CORPORON
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants
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